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Mountain Goat Removal in Olympic
National Park: A Case Study of the Role
of Organizational Culture in Individual
Risk Decisions and Behavior*
Seth Tuler, Gary E. Machlis
and Roger E. Kasperson**
Introduction
Why do individuals perform high-risk activities they perceive as
disagreeable? Activities may be disagreeable because compensation is
inadequate, health and safety are threatened, personal values and task
requirements are in conflict or preferred alternatives are not allowed.
Police may perform disagreeable high-risk activities when called upon to
save dangerous criminals, volunteer fire fighters when asked to risk
their lives for property of dubious worth, combat personnel when
fighting a war whose goals they question, and search-and-rescue
personnel when responding to accidents with ill-prepared victims.
Similar types of activities occur in less exotic situations and ones in
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which the consequences do not physically threaten the actor. For
example, doctors may be called upon to perform procedures with which
they disagree (or not to perform those with which they agree) such as
abortions or certain types of surgery on terminally ill patients.
Will individuals in such situations perform the tasks with high
reliability, dedication and care? And if so, why? We observed a high-
risk activity simultaneously perceived as disagreeable and performed
with professionalism and high reliability. Our observations were made
during a social risk assessment of the Mountain Goat Removal Project
(the project) of the National Park Service (NPS), performed in Olympic
National Park, Washington (the park).
Sport hunters first introduced eleven or twelve mountain goats
(Oreamnos americanus, hereafter goats) into the Olympic Peninsula in
the 1920's.1 By 1983, research scientists estimated a population of
about 1,000 in the park and had documented extensive disturbance of
the area's unique ecosystems. 2 The last ten years have witnessed the
implementation of a variety of methods to minimize or remove the threat
of the goats to the ecosystems of the park In 1988, park personnel
began a live-capture and removal program. It ended after the second
season in 1989.
Mountain goat translocation requires innovative and high-risk
activities at many points in remote backcountry areas. 3 During the
assessment, we became interested in the character of team members'
performances. The project team performed the high-risk activities with
dedication, care and high reliability, while at the same time questioning
the project's necessity, value and ultimate social contribution.
Moreover, they willingly undertook personal risks to reduce potential
health threats to the goats. They did so, in fact, with full knowledge
I OLYMPIC NATIONAL PARK, MOUNTAIN GOAT MANAGEMENTIN OLYMPIC NATIONAL
PARK: ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT (1987).
2 B. Morehead, Olympic NP Stages Well-Run Removal of Exotic Goats, 2 PARK
Sci. 5 (1981).
3 See, e.g., G.E. Machlis, S. Tuler & R.E. Kasperson, A Social Risk Analysis
of the Olympic National Park Mountain Goat Removal Project (U.S. Dept Interior,
NPS D-173, 1990).
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that, in spite of their efforts, the goats would be placed in areas that
would allow them to be hunted and perhaps killed.
Why did they perform so well in such circumstances? We addressed
this question in a case study. By focusing attention on a particular
individual, group or institution the case study allows the subject to be
examined in some depth and with the kind of insight not available from
other approaches, e.g., sample surveys. As Hobbs and Blank note:4
One case study by itself cannot prove much of anything. But
if there are many case studies that tend to agree and that tend
to provide insights to more general conditions, then
sociologists are on the road to a generalization that could
prove significant.
The case study is based on discussions with project personnel and
other experts and a review of the literature on individual risk-taking
behavior. Prior conceptualizations of risk-taking behavior have focused
on individual, group and sociocultural aspects of a person's
environment. 5 Theories focused on the individual, however, seem
unable to account satisfactorily for the actions of team personnel. Based
on the assumptions of rational actors and utility theory, one takes risks
only if perceptions of potential benefits outweigh perceived costs. To
the extent that an activity is perceived as disagreeable, attempts to avoid
it may be amplified. Social and cultural theories generally focus on
judgments and decisions about risk-taking, rather than on the levels of
professionalism or reliability during the activity.
In this case study, we found organizational culture to be an
important mediating factor in determining both individual risk decisions
of the team members as well as the level of their performance of risky
activities. The organizational culture of the NPS enabled the
extraordinary performance of risky activities beyond what traditional
approaches to risk-taking behavior would suggest. Although
organizational culture may not be the only factor that mediates these
4 D.A. HOBBS & S. J. BLANK, SOCIOLOGY AND THE HUMAN ExPERIENcE 18 (3d ed.
1982)
5 0. Renn, Concepts of Risk: A Classification, in SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK 53
(S. Krimsky & D. Golding, eds. 1992); C.A. Heimer, Social Structure,
Psychology, and the Estimation of Risk, 14 ANN. REV. SOcIOL 491 (1988).
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outcomes, it was critical in this case.6
Here we discuss the rationale and implications of our observations.
We first provide a brief description of our methods and the Mountain
Goat Removal project. Next, we review traditional characterizations and
theories of risk-taking behavior. Individual, social and cultural theories
do not satisfactorily account for the risk-taking decisions and quality of
performance observed during the disagreeable activity of goat capture
and removal. We then explore the role that organizational culture played
in the highly reliable and dedicated individual performance of the
project's high-risk activities. In essence, the case study suggests a
mediating role by the organizational culture of the NPS on the actions of
capture team personnel in performing risky tasks. Finally, we suggest
that this case may illustrate broader implications of organizational culture
for risk-taking behavior, risk management and cultural responses to risk
more generally.
Case-Study Methods
We reviewed the project to provide an assessment and safety
recommendations of the social (human factors) risks associated with
goat capture and removal. 7 Primary data about the project were gathered
from two site visits and seven phone interviews. The second visit
afforded personnel the opportunity to correct the authors'
representations of activities performed during capture and removal
activities.
We conducted in-depth interviews of individuals involved 6losely in
the planning and implementation of the project, e.g.:
" the Chief Ranger, administrator of the project,
* a ranger, the primary park employee responsible for the
design and implementation of the project. He developed the
operational requirements and modified equipment necessary
for project implementation. For its duration, he was the
primary employee responsible for capturing and removing
the goats, and
6 Our emphasis on organizational culture does not rule out, e.g., the influence of
personality variables.
7 See Machlis et al., supra note 3; S. Tuler et al., Olympic NP Mountain Goat
Removal Project Subject of Risk Assessment Report, 11 PARK SC. 14 (1991).
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- a park research scientist, who participated in the design
and annual evaluations of project tasks and outcomes.
We also interviewed the owner/operator of the helicopter company that
participated. He had piloted the helicopter for capture and removal
missions prior to 1989. In addition, the helicopter pilot for the summer
of 1989 was interviewed.
Secondary data were collected from phone interviews with several
other individuals experienced in animal capture and removal projects and
hazards of helicopter operation. These included individuals from the
NPS, the Department of Interior Office of Aircraft Safety, helicopter
pilot associations, and outdoor safety and rescue associations. Other
data were derived from texts about the NPS and available surveys of
NPS employee attitudes. We also reviewed prior articles and reports
concerning the project.
Interviewer bias was not a significant barrier to the collection of
data. The park had initiated our project evaluation, and personnel were
dedicated to the improvement of both safety and performance. Because
we were not NPS employees, informants freely discussed their attitudes
and experiences with us. None of us participated in any capture
missions.
The Mountain Goat Removal Project
As mentioned, goat capture and removal required innovative and
difficult activities in remote and rugged backcountry and entailed high
risks. Briefly, a pilot and "gunner" used helicopters to identify, select,
pursue and capture goats. After goats were darted or netted, the gunner
had to alight from the helicopter and restrain, "bag" and secure the goat
to the helicopter. The goat was then flown to a staging area and
transferred to another agency, e.g., the Washington State Department of
Wildlife, for release into native populations elsewhere.
Important task characteristics included:
- Helicopter chases were conducted in very rugged
backcountry at high elevations. Low altitude flights along
ridges and cliffs and in the vicinity of trees were frequent.
Pilots flying these missions said that they were often
pushing their physical and experiential limits and the
helicopter's performance limits.
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* Helicopter landings were frequently required on steep
slopes. Gusts of wind, up and down drafts and loose rock
increased the danger of an accident during required full-
power landings. In areas in which operations usually
occurred, rotor clearance from obstruction, e.g., ledges or
rock out-croppings, was often minimal.
- The gunner had responsibility for physical restraint and
preparation of the goat for transportation. Frequently, the
gunner had to attempt physical restraint with limited working
space and on steep slopes, loose rock or hard snow.
Additional care had to be taken to avoid injury by goats'
horns.
- Fuel management was a critical aspect of the pilot's
activities. Fuel constraints became increasingly difficult as
goat captures occurred in more remote areas of the park.
* Teams frequently worked twelve to fourteen hour days.
Full days began at 5 AM and ended in early afternoon. It
was not uncommon for the pilot to work extra jobs during
the rest of the day. As a non-park employee, the pilot was
often responsible for completing work for other clients.
• Two methods for goat capture were net gun and dart gun.
Each presented unique risks. The active ingredient used in
the dart gun was 10,000 times more powerful than
morphine. Accidental human exposure was apt to be deadly.
Similarly, a net fired at the wrong angle could have become
entangled in the rotors or skids and caused a crash.
The basic sequence of activities involved in the project is shown in
Table 1.
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Table 1
Stages of Mountain Goat Removal Tasks
1. Ground activity
" Advance preparation
" Decision to fly
o Mobilization of personnel
2. Flight to backcountry
3. Search and selection
* Search and capture evaluation
* Decision to attempt capture







5. Medical assessment and preparation
6. Goat transport
7. Crew recovery
8. Flight to base
9. Demobilization and post-capture tasks
Sequences often formed a loop when multiple goat captures
occurred during one day. Also, some operations used two "gunners."
The process of capture and removal was made more complicated since
only two "bodies" in addition to the pilot could be wansported at any one
time, i.e., one goat and one gunner, or two goats or gunners.
Complex helicopter flights, difficult capture from the air, and
handling goats on rugged terrain combined with social factors to
influence the capabilities of personnel to operate safely and reliably for
intensive periods during the summer months. The specific requirements
of each stage of the task potentially created a complex and dangerous set
of activities.
Hazards to individuals arose from potential task failures. The two
principal types of hazards to personnel in the project were:
- physical injuries, including back pain, abrasions, sprains,
fractures, broken bones, accidental drug overdose
consequences and death, and
* psychological, social or economic impacts, such as a loss
of confidence in management or one's peers, loss of wages
3 RISK - Issues in Health & Safety 317 [Fall 1992]
or career opportunity, loss of self-image, impacts on one's
family, stress and anxiety.
Table 2 provides examples of hazards that could have occurred
during each stage of capture and removal.
In 1988, capture missions were flown on eleven days and, in 1989,
on ten days. In spite of the danger and complexity of the tasks, no
accidents or mishaps occurred either in flight or with equipment. There
were no injuries to personnel. In 1988, 80 goats were captured, and, in
1989, 67 were captured. Mortality rates were 9% and 19%,
respectively.
Yet, the perceptions of capture team personnel reflected their degree
of anxiety about the dangers of goat removal. For example, one ranger
discussed how personnel risks, goat mortality and cost-per-goat
captured changed over time. Initially, mountain goats were captured
with netting and other "passive techniques." However, as easy-to-
capture goats were removed, personnel were forced to search more
remote and rugged areas. In the late 1980's, the park began to use
darting and netting capture techniques from helicopters. Consequently,
risks, costs and goat mortalities increased. By 1989, the ranger believed
the costs and risks of these measures to be very high and increasing
rapidly. As the Chief Ranger stated, "the general impression was that
the goats were in less accessible areas of the park, they were harder to
get to, and we were forced to take greater risks with the animals and
staff in order to get them." 8 At the same time, risk exposure varied from
mission to mission because of specific characteristics of, e.g., weather
and terrain.
8 B. Sleeper, Out on a Ledge, 123 ANIMALS 18,24 (1990).
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Table 2
Potential Hazards During Different
Stages of Capture and Removal of Mountain Goats
Potential Hazards
1. Ground activity
2. Flight to backcountry
3. Search and selection





8. Flight to base
9. Demobilization and
post-capture tasks
Anxiety from delays, lost wages, accidental exposure to
carfentanil, helicopter accident
Pilot backache, thermal stress, slip/fall by ground
crew member
Stress from not finding suitable goats, helicopter
accident from fuel mismanagement
Sprained ankle during alightment, frustration because of
goat death or miss, helicopter accident, windchill,
interpersonal conflict over failed attempt, injury from
goat's horns
Back strain while loading goat into goat-bag; depression
over need to destroy goat
Helicopter accident, carfentanil exposure, injury to
gunner while sling loading goat into helicopter, ground
crew injury from helicopter
Hearing loss, helicopter accident, hypothermia,
frustration from inability to retrieve goat
Backache, helicopter accident, hearing loss
Helicopter accident, paperwork, demoralization at lack
of success, automobile accident
A pilot's comments about the flights illustrated similar attitudes
toward risk. He felt he was performing at 85% of the capacity of both
his skills and the helicopter's design. His view was that very little room
for error existed and the risks were very high. Expressions such as
"fear" were used by interviewed individuals normally not inclined to
express deep personal beliefs. They expressed their belief that the 25%
hazard pay bonus was insufficient to warrant the risk. When queried
about potential benefits, one stated that each project member had other
job requirements and that "this is incidental" and not for job security: no
promotions and no rewards were expected for participating.
Our observations indicate that personnel voluntarily performed goat
removal. There were no requirements that specific individuals
participate, and written orders, performance standards such as number
of goats to capture and performance evaluations were absent. In fact, the
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Task Stage
Chief Ranger was especially careful to create an atmosphere in which
administrative expectations for participation were absent. Also, complete
control over project design and implementation were clearly in the hands
of the team leader. Statements by team members also reflected the
absence of perceptions of administrative requirements. For example,
personnel said they would stop participation if complete control over the
project were removed or if performance standards were imposed.
Team personnel were highly committed to the NPS, their jobs and
the task of goat capture and removal. They were long-time employees of
the NPS, dedicated to the "total preservation" of the park, and saw no
room for non-native species of mountain goats. The Chief Ranger has
been quoted as saying that "the question all along has never been should
we remove the goats. Most people understand that exotics have no place
in a national park. The tough moral, ethical and political question has
been how to remove them." 9
Although they wished to remove the goats from the park, team
personnel were also deeply concerned about the welfare of the animals.
For example, extensive attempts were made to reduce goat mortality.
Yet, for some, shooting continues to be preferred for removal because it
is considered more "humane." In fact, the extra efforts entailed by live
capture increased the personal risk of team personnel. Outside
contractors were not used in part because during a test-project phase
they "brutalized" the goats during capture. They were unfamiliar with
both the characteristics of goat biology and the backcountry of the park.
Theories of Risk-Taking Behavior
Individual professionalism and risk-taking observed during the
project present a paradox. The paradox arose from the ambivalent
attitudes and behaviors of team members who:
* had high commitment to the task,
* performed nearly error free in complex, stressful and high-
risk settings,
• perceived the economic benefits from their participation in
the project as small and inconsequential to their participation,
9 Id., at 21.
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- believed that preferable alternatives existed for the removal
of goats from the park, e.g., shooting them
- chose voluntarily to increase their personal risks in order to
decrease the health hazards to the goats, and
- realized that the goats not removed would in all likelihood
be shot and that many they did try to save would either die in
the process or subsequently.
Our attempt to explain this paradox led to exploring traditional
conceptualizations of risk-taking behavior with a focus on the cognitive
aspects of individual mental processing. The dominant psychological
and economic perspectives of risk and risk-taking behavior are based on
individual perceptions of and decisionmaking under uncertainty. 10
According to these approaches, risks are accepted only when they are
associated with larger rewards and, therefore, higher levels of expected
utility (ratios of perceived benefits and costs).11 Risk-taking behavior is
generally expected when clearly identifiable benefits are perceived to
outweigh risks. Individual perceptions of benefits and costs have been
described as functions of external social forces, 12 of personality or of
intrinsic factors, e.g., physiological, neurological and psychological.
For example, research suggests that, in some cases, people are risk-
averse and, in others, they are risk-seeking. Early work on these types
focused on personality dispositions that affect attitudes toward potential
risks and benefits. 13 Personality dispositions are viewed as moderator
variables that both promote consistency across behaviors and lead to
risk-seeking or risk-avoiding behaviors in specific situations. These
10 L. Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the
Attribution Process, 10 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 173 (L.
Berkowitz, ed. 1977); D. KAHNEMAN, P. SLOVIC & A. TVERSKY, JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982); P. Slovic, B. Fischhoff & S.
Lichtenstein, The Psychometric Study of Risk Perception, in RISK EVALUATION AND
MANAGEMENT 3 (V.T. Covello, J. Menkes & J. Mumpower, eds. 1986).
11 Supra note 5.
12 Renn, supra note 5; M. DOUGLAS, RISK ACCEPTABIITY ACCORDING TO THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES (1985); S. Rayner, Management of Radiation Hazards in
Hospitals: Plural Rationalities in a Single Institution, 16 Soc. STUD. SC!. 573
(1986).
13 N. KOGAN & M. WALLACH, RISK TAKING- A STUDY IN COGNITION AND
PERSONArr (1964).
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variables include need achievement, locus of control, "subjective
immunity" and "personal invulnerability." For example, the
psychological construct of "locus of control" may be used to suggest
why persons with higher degrees of internal control perform better in
complex tasks and are more risk-seeking.14
Personality dispositions such as internal or external locus of control,
subjective immunity and personal invulnerability do not adequately
explain the level of performance observed in the project. In fact, project
personnel were fully aware of the dangers and even expressed some
fear. Personality dispositions did not lead them to choose project
activities, although individual characteristics or personality dispositions
may have been important determinants of individuals' choice of career
or work. However, the desirability of a particular job does not provide
an adequate explanation for the performance of a specific activity
perceived as disagreeable.
In discussions of risk-seeking and risk-averse behavior, it is
important to identify the dimensions upon which the risky activities are
evaluated. In particular, both intrinsic and external factors establish a
limited number of dimensions by which individuals evaluate risks. Yet,
the choice of evaluation dimensions can affect evaluation outcomes. For
example, "technical concepts" of risk suggest that individuals consider
event frequencies and the magnitudes of a limited set of consequences,
i.e., mortality, morbidity and property damage. Social psychologists
have also investigated how qualitative characteristics of hazards
influence risk perceptions. 15 Qualitative characteristics include, e.g.,
perceptions of voluntariness, blame, dread and catastrophic potential.
Evaluations of risks based on the technical concept of risk have been
observed to differ markedly from those based on other qualitative
dimensions.16
14 H. M. LEFCOURT, 1 and 3 RESEARCH WTH THE LOCUS OF CONTROL CONSTRUCT
(1984); E. J. PHARES, LOCUS OF CONTROL IN PERSONA.TY (1976).
15 Slovic et al., supra note 10; 0. Renn, Risk Perception and Risk Management:
A Review, 7 RISK ABSTR. 1 (1990).
16 Slovic et al., supra note 10; Renn, supra note 15.
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These and similar approaches focus on the cognitive aspects of
judgment and choice. Recently there has been increased attention on
emotive factors in risk attitudes. This research suggests that factors
other than cognitive evaluations of potential benefits and costs may be
important in risk-taking behavior.17 Emotive factors may affect both the
selection and valuation of different aspects of a risky situation. For
example, fear may lead to stigmatization or to attenuation or
amplification of perceived risks.18
Our interviews with project personnel suggest that they did not
believe that their personal benefits outweighed their potential costs. For
example, they stated that their decisions to participate would have no
impact on their jobs, e.g., wages. In fact, a sophisticated risk-calculus
incorporating many factors appears to have been used by team
personnel. Of course, individual evaluations of behavioral alternatives
may not lead to "optimal" choices because cognitive biases and
heuristics can affect people's estimations, choices and perceptions of
risk.19 Factors that affect decision and judgmental processes are found
in "normal" routine and unfamiliar emergency situations and activities.20
Both experts and lay people are susceptible to the effects of such
factors. 2 1 One type occurs, for example, when individuals attempt to
reduce "cognitive dissonance" by interpreting phenomena so as to
correspond to prior beliefs or values.22 Experimental data also suggest
that individuals are risk-averse when faced with gains (benefits) and
17 A.C. Blomkvist, Psychological Aspects of Values and Risks, in RISK AND
SOCETY 89 (L. Sjoberg, ed. 1987); H. Lyttgens, Human Anxiety, op cit., at 115;
L. Schierow, The Role of Salient Fates and Anxiety in Hazard Perception, in RISK
ANALYSIS: PROSPECIS AND OPPORTUNITIES (C. Zervos, ed. 1992); P. J. Stallen & A.
Tomas, Public Concern About Industrial Hazards, 8 RISK ANAL. 237 (1988).
18 Lyttgens, supra; Schierow, supra.
19 Ross, supra, note 10; Blomkvist, supra note 17; A. Tversky & D. Kahneman,
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974).
20 S. Tuler, Individual, Group, and Organizational Decision Making in
Technological Emergencies: A Review of Research, 2 IND. CRISIS Q. 109 (1988).
21 B. Fischhoff, Judgment and Decision-Making, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN
T-OUGHr 153 (R. Sternberg & E. Smith, eds. 1988).
22 L.FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNIIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
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risk-seeking when exposed to certain losses (costs).23
Such biases and heuristics, however, do not seem appropriate
explanations for the observed behavior of project personnel. Individual
biases and heuristics, such as selective interpretation of information and
prospect theory, do not appear to have attenuated perceived risks. For
example, during capture and removal activities, personnel were well
aware of their vulnerability when pushing the limits of, e.g., helicopter
performance. Moreover, during the project team members neither faced
nor perceived certain losses from refusal to participate in the project. For
example, explicit and implicit administrative threats of job loss or
against career promotion did not exist. Thus, prospect theory would
seem inadequate to explain risk-taking behavior in this case.
A frequent distinction made in discussions of risk is between the
voluntary or involuntary acceptance of phenomena that are perceived as
risks.24 Because the dominant characterizations of risk assume that
risky phenomena are undesirable, voluntary risks are thought to be
taken by an individual because the possible gains, e.g., money, status
or pleasure, derived from the outcomes are expected to outweigh the
possible losses. This conceptualization, however, suggests only a
limited view of the factors that contribute to voluntary acceptance of
risks such as observed in the project. As Heimer notes, "such a theory
cannot explain why people would actively seek chances to face risks,
for instance by choosing games with more risk designed into them, by
gambling or by engaging in dangerous sports." 25
Recently, sociologists have extended our understanding of behavior
in voluntary risk-taking contexts. 2 6 Anticipated benefits can be a
23 D. Kahneman & A. Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk Uncertainty, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); A. Tversky & D. Kahneman,
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981);
B. Fischhoff, Predicting Frames, 9 J. EXP. PSYCH., LEARNING, MEMORY &
CoGNION 103 (1983).
24 Slovic et al., supra note 10; Renn, supra note 15.
25 Supra note 5, at 509.
26 G.E. Machlis & E.A. Rosa, Desired Risk: Broadening the Social Amplification
of Risk Framework, 18 RISK ANAL 161, 162 (1990); S. Lyng, Edgework: A
Social Psychological Analysis of Voluntary Risk Taking, 95 AM. J. SOCIOL 851
(1990).
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function of the cognitive and emotive aspects of risk experience, e.g.,
excitement or challenge, or the ends toward which the risky behavior is
directed.2 7 "Desired risks" have been defined by Machlis and Rosa as
"activities or events that have uncertainties of outcome or consequence,
and where the uncertainties are an essential, sought component of the
behavior."2 8 Thus, risk is not assumed to be something negative or
dreaded, as in earlier conceptualizations of risk.
This characterization of risk-taking behavior fails to explain why
individuals may purposefully increase personal risks when voluntarily
performing an activity that is not desired. For example, park personnel
were generally not in favor of, nor did they encourage the
implementation of, a live capture and removal program. They preferred
the alternative of shooting the goats. Moreover, personnel did not speak
of the project or their tasks in terms of desired risks, e.g., thrills or
excitement. At the same time, capture team personnel purposefully
increased their risks in order to reduce the health hazards to the goats.
They did this fully understanding the implications of their actions, with
no desire for the added danger faced during a disagreeable task.
Of course, the notion of "voluntariness" raises questions about the
overt and subtle coercive factors that can cause people to act under
certain circumstances. Individual perceptions of potential negative
consequences, such as loss of esteem by others, are important to the
definition of voluntariness. Voluntariness of an activity also depends on
the absence of perceptions of actual or potential retribution from others.
For example, in a recent sociological review of risk, Heimer
suggested that decisions by British offshore workers to take risks are
based on fear of being fired if they refuse rather than on desire for a
bonus if they take the risk.29 Thus, "the quick decision to accept an
especially dangerous task is motivated by a desire to avoid a certain loss
(being fired or punished). Workers choose to gamble rather than to
accept certain losses." 30 In the case of offshore workers the certain
27 Lyng, supra.
28 Machlis & Rosa, supra note 26.
29 Supra note 5.
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losses are a direct result of the exercise of administrative control.
Traditional conceptualizations of risk suggest, moreover, that
coerced participation in high-risk activities can lead to negative attitudes
and decreased quality of performance by those involved.3 1 For
example, perceived or actual coercion could lead to:
" personnel refusal and "acceptance" of retribution,
" grudging performance, with externalized or internalized
anger, or
* good performance, with negative attitudes or low
satisfaction.
As stated before, however, in this case no explicit or implicit
administrative threats of job loss or against career promotion existed.
Project personnel characterized their participation as voluntary. The
Chief Ranger established an atmosphere lacking administrative
expectations that particular individuals participate or that predefined
goals be reached within a certain time period. The capture team
personnel were left the option of refusing to participate. They stated that
only under certain conditions were they willing to participate. Given this
control over project design and implementation they exhibited strong
dedication to the project.
Organizational Culture
So far, we have reviewed the literature that focuses on the individual
aspects of psychological functioning that mediate risk-taking decisions
and behavior. However, there are also factors related to the social and
cultural aspects of a person's environment that can influence personal
decisions and behaviors. Social and cultural processes may subtly shift
individual perceptions of benefits, costs, acceptability and voluntariness
of activities and situations. 32 Worldviews and cultural beliefs can frame
perceptions and establish meanings and experiences attached to risks,
which in turn can determine behavior. For example, attitudes of duty
and dedication may reflect cultural belief patterns and affect the
perceptions of and responses to risky situations.
30 Supra note 5, at. 504.
31 0. Renn, personal communication (1991).
32 Douglas, supra note 12; Rayner, supra note 12; P.L. BERGER & T. LuCKMANN,
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCITON OF REA=Y (1966).
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In particular, an organization's shared history and stability can
contribute to the internalization and institutionalization of specific
attitudes in individuals. 33 "Organizational culture" is the pattern of basic
assumptions that are invented, discovered or developed to help cope
with problems of external adaptation and internal integration within an
organization. 34 The patterns of assumptions may incorporate values,
norms, rules, myths, stories and rituals; must have worked well enough
in the past to be considered valid; and must be taught to new members
as the correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to the external
and internal problems encountered by the organization.
Little of the prior work on organizational culture has focused on
contexts involving high risk or commanding high reliability. Moreover,
the organizational culture literature usually addresses the issue of
organizational decisions rather than individual decisions. The exceptions
have focused on police,35 combat teams and military organizations,36
crisis management3 7 and "high-reliability organizations." '3 8 For
example, Roberts reports that high-reliability organizations, such as
naval aircraft carriers, public electrical utilities and air traffic control, can
develop cultures that support personnel innovation, risk-taking and
31 L. Smircich & M.B. Calas, Organizational Culture: A Critical Assessment, in
HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION 228 (F. M. Jablin et al., eds.
1987); E. Schein, Organizational Culture, 45 A. PSYCHOLOGIST 109 (1990).
34 Schein, supra.
35 j. van Maanen, & R. Katz, Police Perceptions of their Work Environment, 6
SOCiOL WORK& Occ. 31 (1979).
36 M. Janowitz, Military Organization, in HANDBOOK OF MILITARY INSITIMIONS
13 (R. Little, ed. 1971); A. L. George, Primary Groups, Organization, and Military
Performance, op cit., at 293; C. W. Greenbaum, The Small Group Under the Gun:
Uses of Small Groups in Battle Conditions, 3 J. APPL BEHAV. SCL 392 (1979).
37 1.1. Mitroff et al., Do (Some) Organizations Cause Their Own Crises? The
Cultural Profiles of Crisis-Prone vs. Crisis Prepared Organizations, 3 IND. CRISIS
Q. 269 (1989); D. Smith, Beyond Contingency Planning: Towards a Model of
Crisis Management, 4 IND. CRISIS Q. 263 (1990).
38 K.H. Roberts, New Challenges in Organizational Research: High-Reliability
Organizations, 3 IND. CRis Q. 111 (1989); D.M. Rousseau, The Price of Success?
Security-Oriented Cultures and High-Reliability Organizations, 3 IND. CRISIS Q. 285
(1989).
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teamwork.39 Similarly, Greenbaum emphasizes the roles and functions
of primary groups in the behavior of soldiers under dangerous
conditions. 4 0 These studies suggest the important role that
organizational culture can play in promoting motivation and commitment
for the performance of risky activities.
Organizational Culture of the National Park Service
In this section we overview briefly the NPS and its organizational
culture.4 1 This culture, we argue, influenced the capture team's attitudes
toward mountain goat capture and removal and helped to shape their
assumptions and values toward the undertaking.
The prevailing organizational culture of the NPS attracts and fosters
particular values, attitudes and skills among the rangers. This culture
was established 75 years ago:42
behind the romanticism surrounding the National Park idea
stand the individual employees of the NPS. Over the past 71
years, these employees have developed a strong sense of
family and tradition. Stephen Mather and Horace Albright,
the first directors, are still revered as father figures and
dynamic leaders who provided the agency with clarity and
vision. Many children have followed parents into NPS
careers. The mission of the Service is vivid and alive. The
deep respect agency employees feel for the resources they
protect and visitors they serve results in collective agency
pride that is unusual among bureaucracies.
The concept of "total preservation" of representative ecosystems,
including both biotic and abiotic environments, has become an
increasingly important objective within the NPS. Foresta observes that
the internalization of this value is suggested by a survey finding 84% of
agency personnel polled agreed that "preservation is the major purpose
39 Roberts, supra.
40 Greenbaum, supra note 36.
41 These issues are discussed more fully elsewhere. See NATIONAL PARKS IN CRISIS
(E.H. Connally, ed. 1982); R.A. FORESTA, AMECA'S NATIONAL PARKS AND THEI
KEEPERS, 104 (1984); W.C. EVERHART, THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE (1972); A.
RUNTE, NATIONAL PARKS: THE AMERICANEXPERIENCE (1979).
42 NATIONAL PARKS AND CONSERVATION ASSN., 9 THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE: I'Is
ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYEs v (1988).
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of the National Park Service.',4 3 The survey sample included rangers as
well as administrative and other support staff.
The value of total preservation has been translated into action with
attempts to remove non-native animals from park areas.44 This attitude
has been expressed by individuals at the park involved in the project.
For example, Mark Sheehan, manager of the Washington Natural
Heritage Program, has stated that "Olympic National Park's rare alpine
plants are relics from the Ice Age that have survived several episodes of
glaciation. It would be a shame to have them perish due to the impact of
this exotic species.' 4 5
Mountain goat capture and removal illustrates park rangers' critical
role in the "front lines" of park management. Yet, they have a diverse
set of responsibilities that include not only resource management but
education and visitor safety and protection as well. They are
characterized by a diverse set of backgrounds, creative problem-solving
skills, independence and high degrees of self motivation. Two of the
"prime qualities of the park ranger are independence and adaptability to
work in isolated regions. ' 46 These characteristics are reflected in both
behavior and expressed attitudes. One park employee stated that the
project was "a challenge to our rangerhood."
In summary, park rangers form an important subculture within the
NPS. They consider themselves professionals dedicated to the goals of
the NPS. Often, they are drawn to work for the NPS out of appreciation
for the natural world and "altruistic missionary reasons." Loyalty is high
and turn-over is low. Some NPS personnel we spoke to believe there is
an "elite, behind-the-scenes" group of core professionals selected for
prestigious positions in the "gem" parks.
43 Foresta, supra note 41.
44 Separate personal communications from C. Janda and M. McCurry (1990).
45 Sleeper, supra note 8, at 20.
46 B. Caldwell, Development of Models for Park Rangers' Perceived Isolation of
National Park Service Areas, 22 ENv. & BEHAVIOR 636 (1990).
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Discussion
Conceptualizations of risk-related behavior that focus on the
individual's mental processing are unable to explain fully the actions of
personnel during the project. Analyses of risk-taking behavior generally
expect the existence of clearly identifiable benefits that outweigh
perceived risks. Yet, during the project, personnel perceived few
benefits from the activity. The project conflicted with the values that led
them to prefer the alternative of shooting the goats. The benefits that
they perceived were marginal and related to the social context of
participation, e.g., increased prestige and self-esteem.
A fuller explanation of risk-taking decisions and highly reliable
performance and professionalism requires discussion of the situational
understanding of team personnel. In particular, the beliefs and practices
of an organization create a set of limits within which social behavior
must be contained, and they establish a pervasive, but subtle, system of
control. The values, assumptions, symbols, myths, norms and rules of
the NPS help explain ranger willingness to perform risky activities by
establishing specific types of perceived responsibilities. In addition,
they assist our understanding of reliability in performance and
dedication to the high-risk activity of goat removal.
The argument that undesired, high-risk activities were performed
because of the NPS organizational culture rests on two propositions.
First, observations led us to conclude that the high-risk task of goat
removal was undesired. For example, the language of desired-risk was
not used in any of the interviews. There was no mention of thrill,
excitement or other similar terms that often appear in descriptions of
desirable risks.47 In addition, the project was a result of forces external
to the park, e.g., public interest groups. In no way did park personnel
actively seek or encourage the live capture and removal project.
Satisfaction of the value of "total preservation" of the park's ecosystem
did not depend on the live capture and removal of the goats to hunted
populations elsewhere. Preferred alternatives could have been
implemented with less risk to personnel. Finally, park personnel did not
47 Machlis and Rosa, supra note 26.
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actively pursue involvement. Instead, the Chief Ranger asked the team
leader if he were willing and gave him complete control over the
project's design and implementation.
The second proposition is that participation in the project was
voluntary. We evaluated the possibility of coercive forces that underlie
capture personnel participation because this seemed the first obvious
explanation. The evidence, however, convinced us that participation
was genuinely voluntary. As we noted previously, the Chief Ranger
established an atmosphere lacking in normative expectations that certain
individuals participate. For example, while it was to his advantage to
require participation, he went out of his way to ensure that
administrative control was absent. There were no written orders, no
performance standards and no performance evaluations. The Chief
Ranger's success was reflected by team personnel who stated their
beliefs that there was no administrative control, e.g., the team leader
noted that his job evaluations would not reflect his successful
implementation and performance of the project.
Why, then, were capture team personnel willing to place themselves
at high risk? We have suggested that the performance of high-risk
activities is usually related to the attainment of important benefits. In this
situation, the identification of benefits is difficult and they are
ambiguous. However, statements of project personnel suggest that the
NPS organizational culture created specific benefits to the individual.
These included enhanced self-perceptions and perceptions of others.
Esteem in the NPS is developed by being "good soldiers" and achieving
task goals that support the belief that "rangers can do anything." The
activity of goat capture and removal is regarded by peers as "real" ranger
activity - the epitome of ranger professionalism. In addition, project
personnel believe that they have developed new "cutting edge"
techniques in live capture of wildlife in general and mountain goats in
particular. Perceptions of professionalism are related to the ability to
avoid unnecessary animal mortality. The development of successful
techniques can also increase their prestige among the "elite" of the NPS.
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The structure of the project also affected willingness to perform the
high-risk activities. In part, the structure derived from the organizational
culture that encourages independence and a "can-do" attitude. Project
personnel had significant independent control over task design,
implementation and operation. Once the project was under way, they
were free from constraints placed by administrative or outside agents. In
fact, project personnel stated that without complete and independent
control over the project, they "probably wouldn't have done it at all or
for very long." Internalized organizational values of loyalty and
professionalism combine to form the attitude that "if you get involved,
you can't do any less than your utmost." Thus, organizational culture
also helps to explain the dedication of project personnel as well as the
high degree of "team" morale and the confidence shared among rangers,
pilots and supervisors.
Conclusion
The Mountain Goat Removal Project in Olympic National Park
suggests a set of cases where organizational cultural may play an
important role in mediating individual risk-taking decisions as well as in
influencing the quality of individual performance. Traditional theories
for explaining individual risk-taking behavior are dominated by
assumptions of rational actors and utility theory. Yet, as we have seen,
individuals may actively pursue a task perceived as disagreeable even
when potential costs appear to outweigh expected benefits. During the
project, organizational culture was critical to participants' understanding
of the project and their roles in it.
Additional research is needed to understand better the role and
importance of organizational culture in risky tasks. Important questions
to address further include identification of when organizational culture is
important in mediating risk-taking behaviors and task performance. For
example, when and how might organizational culture enable
extraordinary performance of high-risk and disagreeable tasks? What
aspects of organizational culture matter most and how are they related to
other mediating factors such as personal values, available alternatives or
job satisfaction? Performance of undesired risks may be part of an
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interaction between personality dispositions and organizational culture.
For example, individual self-selection may result from personality
dispositions, which in turn become reinforced by an organizational
culture that reflects a set of values that initially attracted the individual.
The congruity between personality factors and organizational culture
may make it easier to internalize and reinforce the values that result in
the performance of undesired tasks.
A similar issue concerns how aspects of organizational culture may
be related to a task's outcome. For example, how is reliability a function
of organizational culture? A high degree of professionalism may seem at
first glance to reduce the likelihood of errors in task performance.
However, the expertise engendered by professionalism may also be
understood as a trained incapacity to see new threats and thus act to
increase the likelihood of some types of errors.4 8
Further research can help clarify the processes by which
organizational cultures influence how social meanings are attached to
particular risks. Organizational culture may amplify or attenuate
perceptions of specific attributes of a risky activity and the way the
attributes are weighed.4 9 It may also affect perceptions of the need for
risk-reducing measures, 50 e.g., organizational culture may lead to
strong risk management even when personal calculations about the
specific risks and benefits of an activity may suggest otherwise.
Similarly, individual decisions can frequently reflect the values of
larger social groups. For example, organizations may establish "correct"
core values for members. Personnel values can become carriers of
organizational culture, thus affecting individual calculations of benefits
48 B. Means et al., Training Decision Makers for the Real World, in DECISION
MAKINGIN ACIION: MDELS AND MEnHODS (G. Klein, J. Orasanu & R. Calderwood,
eds. in press); J. REASON. HUMAN ERROR (1990).
49 R.E. Kasperson et al., The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual
Framework, 8 Risk Anal. 177 (1988); R.E. Kasperson, The Social Amplification
of Risk: Progress in Developing an Integrative Framework of Risk, in SOCIAL
THEORIES OF RISK 153 (S. Krimsky & D. Golding, eds. 1992).
50 J.X. Kasperson & R.E. Kasperson, Corporate Culture and Technology Transfer,
in CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTALISMINA GLOBAL ECONOMY (H.S. Brown et al., eds.
in press).
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and costs. Thus, park rangers may readily perceive high risks of goat
capture and removal tasks, yet identify with core NPS values that call
for highly professional behavior even in questionable or high-risk
situations. These issues are not specific to the performance of activities
within the NPS, but may reflect a general phenomena of organizations
with strong cultures and clear missions. Consequently, additional
understanding of organizational culture may have important practical
implications for improvement of hazard management, task design and
occupational safety in high-risk contexts.
